Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract by Levy, Howard A.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2
1972
Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract
Howard A. Levy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Howard A. Levy, Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract, 23 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 393 (1972)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol23/iss2/8
1972]
NOTE
Bankruptcy and the Land Sale Contract*
The primary impact of a bankruptcy is usually absorbed by the cred-
itors of the bankrupt party. But when the party taking bankruptcy is
in the business of selling land with land sale installment contracts, the
party's customers, the vendees, can suffer losses even more onerous than
the creditors. This Note examines the legal status of the vendee who
purchases land by an installment contract and compares him to the land
purchaser who relies, instead, on a mortgage. Then, on the basis of eco-
nomics and equity, the author concludes that the vendee should not be
subjected to the extreme penalties he imay now undergo when the vendor
of the land becomes bankrupt. Because the existing protection for the
vendee appears inadequate, the author suggests various changes in the
law, principal among which is an amendment to the Bankhuptcy Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
N MOST BANKRUPTCY SITUATIONS, the bankrupt's creditors are the
only ones who are likely to suffer financial injury. The creditors
frequently do not recover the full amount of their debts from the
bankrupt's estate, and the bankrupt himself is relieved of his finan-
cial obligations. But the result is different when the bankrupt is the
vendor in a land sale contract.1 Again, his creditors may suffer
some loss, but that is not cause for unusual concern - a chance of
loss is one of the risks of being a commercial creditor. What is dis-
turbing and inequitable is that the bankrupt land vendor's debtor -
the vendee under the land sale contract - will likely incur financial
loss although still ready, willing and able to perform in compliance
with the land sale contract. The vendee in this situation may suffer
substantial losses because of section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act,'
which authorizes a bankruptcy trustee to reject executory contracts.
*The writer wishes to acknowledge the help of Professor Morris G. Shanker, whose
conversation, writings and private correspondence have been useful in the preparation
of this Note.
I There are two basic types of land sale contracts. One is the "buy-sell" agreement,
in which a deed is conveyed and closing of terms follows. The other is the installment
sale contract, in which legal title remains with the vendor until the contract is performed
and which is used as a security device in place of a mortgage or deed of trust. This Note
is concerned with the latter. See generally G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES 29-31 (2d ed. 1970).
This Note is also limited to the problem of land sale installment contracts. Install-
ment contracts for the purchase of personalty raise a number of different questions,
both legal and economic, not present when dealing with realty. See, e.g., UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506 (which gives the buyer-debtor rights similar to a mort-
gagor's equity of redemption).
2 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
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An example will clarify the vendee's position. Assume the pro-
spective vendor owns a tract of land and his ambition is to subdivide
it into quarter-acre lots to be sold as modest home sites to low and
middle income purchasers.
For a number of reasons, the vendee may make his purchase
using a land sale contract, rather than a mortgage.3 When a land
sale contract is used, the vendee acquires legal title only after he
has made his final installment payment. Location of title in the
vendor pending performance of the contract means that the con-
tract may be deemed executory as to both parties, and the vendee
may remain an unsecured party,4 except to the extent that an equit-
able lien might afford him relief in bankruptcy court.'
Continuing with the example, assume the parties enter into a
land sale contract with a purchase price of $10,000, allowing the
vendee to take immediate possession and obligating him to begin
payments. Even though the vendee subsequently pays $9,000 of
the $10,000 contract price, if the vendor goes bankrupt, the danger
is that the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy may reject any tender of
final payment by the vendee.6  The trustee's authority is section
3 A land sale contract usually involves only two parties, vendor and vendee, as op-
posed to the general three-party arrangement of a purchase money mortgage where a
third party serves as financier. Other tripartite arrangements are the blanket mortgage
and the subdivision trust. In a blanket mortgage, the vendor gives a bank a mortgage
on the entire parcel of land under development and obtains a release; the vendee of
each lot becomes a mortgagor of the bank, and the vendor is no longer a debtor. The
bank then could acquire some control regarding who becomes the bank's mortgagors.
Under a subdivision trust, title remains with a trustee until payments have been
completed by the beneficiary, the vendee. These arrangements are not executory con-
tracts and would not be subject to rejection by the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy. See
Carlock, The Subdivision Trust - A Useful Device in Real Estate Transactions, 5 ARIz.
L. REV. 1 (1963); Rehnquist, Subdivision Trusts and the Bankruptcy Act, 3 AaiZ. L.
REv. 165 (1961).
4 The foreclosure provision in the standard land sale contract of a Pennsylvania rec-
reation lot vendor reads as follows:
This conveyance is also made upon the express condition and covenants
that Grantee will make all the payments as provided in the Agreement of Sale
and if Grantee fails to do so, then the title and interest in and to the premises
hereby conveyed shall be and become wholly void and the premises and all
interests therein shall revert to and become reinvested in Grantor.
5 It has not yet been decided conclusively whether an equitable lien could be ex-
tended to the vendee in a bankruptcy situation. If so, he would take priority over unse-
cured creditors in obtaining a refund of his payments from the bankrupt's estate. See
notes 44-53 infra & accompanying text.
6 The trustee may reject without an express order from the court. 4A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 5 70.43 (5), at 530 (14th ed. 1969).
A bankruptcy receiver could also exercise the power of assumption or rejection of
executory contracts under section 70(b). He would be the appropriate officer in a
reorganization proceeding, as distinct from the trustee in a non-reorganization bank-
ruptcy. See In re Forgee Metal Products, Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956).
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70(b) which permits rejection of an executory contract.7  The trus-
tee may at the same time sell the land to a third party for a price
greater than the contract terms and apply the revenue to the estate
for the benefit of creditors. The original vendee becomes nothing
more than a creditor for that portion of the contract price he has
paid, unless the contract gave him a legal lien or the bankruptcy
court recognizes his lien in equity. In the role of an unsecured
creditor, the vendee would benefit from the land sale in the same
percentage as the vendor's other unsecured creditors.8
This sequence of events may occur when financing for purchase-
money mortgages is scarce,9 or when the vendee does not have suffi-
dent funds to pay for the portion of the purchase price not covered
7 Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act reads, in full:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an un-
expired lease of real property, within sixty days after the adjudication or
within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later,
but the court may for cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such con-
tract or lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed to be
rejected. If a trustee is not appointed, any such contract or lease shall be
deemed to be rejected within thirty days after the date of the order directing
that a trustee be not appointed. A trustee shall file, within sixty days after
adjudication or within sixty days after he has qualified, whichever is later,
unless the court for cause shown extends or reduces the time, a statement under
oath showing which, if any, of the contracts of the bankrupt are executory in
whole or in part, including unexpired leases of real property, and which, if
any, have been rejected by the trustee. Unless a lease of real property ex-
pressly otherwise provides, a rejection of the lease or of any covenant therein
by the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the lessee of his estate. A gen-
eral covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be assigned shall not be
construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and
subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an assignment
by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either
party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate
the same is enforcible. A trustee who elects to assume a contract or lease of
the bankrupt and who subsequently, with the approval of the court and upon
such terms and conditions as the court may fix after hearing upon notice to
the other party to the contract or lease, assigns the contract or lease to a third
person, is not liable for breaches occurring after the assignment.
8 The Bankruptcy Act grants the status of creditor to persons injured by the rejection
of executory contracts. Report of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, reprinted in 1
BANKR. L REP. 5 8212 (May 27, 1938) (explanatory note).
9 One remedial proposal is to lower interest rates on mortgages, by putting more
money into the hands of lending institutions, through reduction of reserve requirements.
G llies, The Scarcity of Capital for Mortgage Lending in California: An Economic or
Legal Problem?, 9 U.C.LA.L REv. 545, 547, 551-60 (1962).
The Federal Government can exercise considerable influence over the real estate in-
dustry by its monetary policy as a whole. For example, if it limits the sales of its own
securities, notably treasury bills, in the open market, interest rates may remain high;
or a significant increase in the amount of money permitted in circulation by the Federal
Reserve Board may cause interest rates to drop. The current wage-price freeze, if ex-
tended to interest rates, could foster the growth of the real estate industry, because pro-
spective home buyers would find an incentive in lower borrowing costs.
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by the amount of the mortgage. 10 When mortgage money becomes
scarce, commercial or consumer land development companies that
have little capital turn to land sale contracts as a means of low-
equity financing."
Although the number of actual bankruptcies and reorganizations
has been "relatively minor in the overall picture' 12 of land sales,
there is a significant potential for such bankruptcies in the consumer
area. Installment contracts are customary where builders have ac-
quired land for development, and mail-order developers in Florida,
California, the Southwest and the Midwest' 3 have been generating
a high volume of land installment contract sales for a period of
years. In fact, the mail-order land business has an annual sales
volume that ranges from an estimated $700 million to over one
billion dollars,'4 of which a significant percentage is conducted with
installment contracts. An economic downswing could drive some
of these vendor-developers into bankruptcy.
Vendors with marginal financing, then, can endanger the invest-
10 G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 29.
1 The experience of the Penn Central Railroad, which is a major land owner, is an
example of how unexpectedly a commercial giant can fall into reorganization or bank-
ruptcy and subject the vendee to land sale bankruptcy problems.
12 Letter from Mr. Roy P. Cookston, Administrator, Office of Interstate Land Sales
Registration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., to
the author, June 29, 1971.
13 Warren, California Installment Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 608, 609 n.2 (1962). See also W. LAAs, MAKE MONEY IN LAND
78, 88 (1971), which is a promotional book from a leading developer in Arizona and
New Mexico. The developer provides the book without cost to certain potential cus-
tomers who respond to his television ads.
14 113 CONG. REc. 315-18 (1967) (comments by Senator Williams accompanying
his introduction of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, S. 275, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1967)). Generally, the documentation of the extent of land sale contracts is
sparse.
See also To PROTECT THE AMERICAN CONSUMER - MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Do. No. 57, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
113 CONG. REc. 3527, 3529 (1967).
In addition to their use by commercial vendees, installment contracts are used in the
purchase and sale of retirement havens, vacation lots, investment acreage, homesites in
developing communities and farmland. 113 CONG. REC. 315 (1967). Land sale con-
tracts are also necessary for the purchase of inner city lots on which homes are already
built, because many buyers otherwise have difficulty obtaining financing. See generally,
Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, with Proposals
for Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City, 7 HOus-
TON L. REV. 523 (1970). Unlike the large-scale land sale promotions, the individual
inner city transactions are often outside the coverage of the Interstate Land Sales Regis-
tration Act, whose provisions were drafted to enable the purchaser to rescind where the
vendor has used fraud regarding any material term of the contract. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1701-20 (1970). See generally Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of Land Sales:
Full Disclosure Comes Down lo Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1969).
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ments of substantial numbers of land sale contract purchasers. This
Note will demonstrate that the risk to the land sale installment con-
tract vendee is an unwarranted one and that, when the vendor takes
bankruptcy, the vendee who purchased property using a land sale
contract should receive the same protection afforded the purchase-
money mortgagor. Second, it will show that existing remedies are
inadequate to provide the required protection to the vendee. Con-
sequently, the author will propose new remedies to enable the land
sale vendee who continues performance to retain possession of his
land and have his contract completed, despite the vendor's bank-
ruptcy.
II. THE LAND SALE VENDEE'S RIGHTS WHEN THE
VENDOR TAKES BANKRUPTCY
In order to understand the vendee's position, it is best to exam-
ine his rights in comparison with those of a mortgagor, and then to
consider the vendee's rights in the context of the vendor's bank-
ruptcy.
A. How the Vendee Compares with the Mortgagor
The purchase-money mortgage and the land sale contract have
the same function: to secure the payment of unpaid purchase money.
As purchasers, the mortgagor and the person who buys with an in-
stallment contract occupy parallel positions, in that both have de-
layed part of their payment obligation until some time after pos-
session.' 5 But their similarity from the economic perspective is not
reflected in their legal positions. A defaulting mortgagor has an
equity of redemption - the right to get back his land by tendering
late payment'6 - while a defaulting vendee ordinarily may not re-
deem.17 And a defaulting vendee may lose more than his land:
the vendor may retain all of the vendee's payments, and even sue
for installments yet due if the contract so provides. 8 The vendee
is treated differently than the mortgagor because the mortgagor's
equity of redemption historically became established as a "right,"' "
15 The chief distinction between the two from an economic perspective is the tradi-
tionally smaller initial payment required under an installment contract. See also note
22 infra.
16See generally G. OSBORNE, SECuRED TRANSACnONS 218-22 (1967).
.7E.g., Heckard v. Sayre, 34 111. 142 (1864).
18OSBORNE, supra note 16, at 29. If a court were to hold that such contractual
provisions constituted liquidated damage clauses, it could refuse to enforce them.
19The statutory right to redeem from the purchaser on a foreclosure sale does not
arise until the equity of redemption has been extinguished. Id. at 219.
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while the vendee's position under contract principles made specific
performance and relief from forfeiture discretionary ° In Rothen-
berg v. Follman, a Michigan court put the comparison in an histori-
cal framework:
One way of viewing the matter is to visualize the present state
of the law regarding specific performance and relief from for-
feiture in favor of a defaulting land contract purchaser as equiv-
alent to the state of the law preceding recognition of the equity of
redemption as the mortgagor's undoubted right, when the court of
equity relieved against the condition of the mortgage in some cases
and not in others as a matter of discretion depending on the
equities. 21
Thus, under present law the land sale vendee receives, at best,
a lien in equity for his payments, unless other rights are given in the
contract or by statute. If the vendor becomes insolvent and his
trustee in bankruptcy rejects the executory land contract, the vendee
may lose both possession of the land and his payments because he
lacks the rights which the mortgagor would have under similar
circumstances.
Why then would a prospective vendee run the risk of entering
a land sale contract when he might have the security of a mortgage
instead? The land sale contract may appeal to the vendee because
it involves a relatively small initial payment, although the interest
rate on the installment payments is often higher than for a purchase-
money mortgage.2 2  Furthermore, in periods of tight money, when
mortgage loans are difficult for the vendee to obtain, the land sale
installment contract may be the only alternative. Land sale con-
tracts likewise may be attractive to a vendor because he has the right
to recover the property in a forfeiture action against a defaulting
purchaser, which enables the vendor to contract with higher risk pur-
chasers, and also to reap unusual profits. The net result is that the
The lack of a right of redemption in the vendee distinguishes a land sale contract
from a mortgage. 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 493 (1962).
2 0 Rothenberg v. Follman, 172 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
21 Id. at 848 nA.
22 Frequently the vendee may not be able to finance a mortgage agreement requiring
a high down payment. In this situation he might consider a land sale contract with a
lower down payment and a higher rate of interest as the best alternative. Contract terms,
however, are set by the parties, and land contracts do exist which, to the purchaser, have
rates more favorable than mortgages. The underlying assumption of this Note, neverthe-
less, is that many commercial and consumer purchasers enter into disadvantageous land
contracts because of their weak financial position.
If the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is widely adopted, the vendee will receive
increased protection if he can establish that the land sale was a consumer credit transac-
tion. See CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE, New Rules on Consumer Credit Protec-
tion (eff. February 10, 1969), § 4721, at 254.
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vendee obtains credit for that portion of the sale price remaining
unpaid, and the commercial vendor acquires working capital from
both the down payment and subsequent installments.
B. Land Sale Contracts and the Policies of the Bankruptcy Act
The common law distinction between the mortgagor's rights and
the vendee's contract rights had been read into the Bankruptcy Act,
even before section 70(b) made the power to reject executory con-
tracts explicit.' The enactment of section 70(b) has been con-
strued to merely reaffirm the prior case law 4 The pertinent part
of that section provides that:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract, includ-
ing an unexpired lease of real property, within sixty days after the
qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but the court may
or cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such contract or
lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed to
be rejected.
Nothing in either the text or legislative history indicates that land
contracts should be treated differently than any other executory con-
tract. Thus, section 70(b) appears to permit rejection of the land
sale vendee's contract and it has been so read.' 5
The land sale contract, however, need not be considered execu-
tory as to both parties. It could be argued that the bankrupt vendor
has completed performance, except for the passing of title, and that
the contract, as to him, is no longer executory2 and thus not subject
to rejection under section 70(b). Although logically consistent,
this argument has not been accepted in bankruptcy court.
2 7
A further argument that may be available to avoid rejection is
that the trustee can only reject burdensome executory contracts and
that a land sale contract which is already profitable is not burden-
some merely because the trustee can find a more profitable contract
in the current market2 However, foremost. in the trustee's mind
2 3See Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313 (1892).
2 4 4A COLLIR, supra note 6, 5 70A3 (2), at 521.
25 In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
Note that section 70(b) explicitly provides that the lessee cannot be deprived of his
estate.
2 6See Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, Bus. LAWYER
1391, 1401-05 (1971). Clearly the Act considers a mortgage executed when title has
passed. See also In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1963),
in which the court held guarantees of leases were executory contracts which could not
be rejected in bankruptcy.
2 7 In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
2 8 Cf. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co. 278 F. 842, 843-
44 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), where the court stated that a
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is the need to marshal assets for the benefit of creditors. If he as-
sumes a contract, the bankrupt's estate is charged with the expense
of managing the contract, so the trustee will not assume a contract
unless it is profitable enough to outweigh the attendant liabilities.0
But it does not necessarily follow from this conception of the trus-
tee's role under the Bankruptcy Act that the trustee should be per-
mitted to reject an already profitable contract.
Nonetheless, the only cases that have applied section 70(b) in
similar factual situations have held that the purchaser in a land sale
contract cannot compel specific performance from the seller's trustee
in bankruptcy. In In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc.,
Judge Weinfeld refused to allow specific performance for a land
sale vendee against the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy and com-
mented generally on section 70(b): "Its underlying principle, and
that of the case law which preceded its enactment, is that the trustee
in bankruptcy may abandon burdensome property and reject un-
profitable executory contracts in order to further the best interests
of the estate."30  Although this language emphasizes the burden-
some aspects of executory contracts, the opinion gave no indication
that specific performance would ever be available, regardless of the
circumstances. Under New York Investors, the rejecting trustee
stands in the shoes of the vendor and has legal title, which prevails
against any equitable title the vendee may have."' The vendee can-
not retain his property and has only a claim for damages. 2
Relying upon New York Investors, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held in Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co.-' that the doc-
trine of equitable conversion does not give the vendee with an equit-
able ownership a right superior to that of the trustee, who may,
using the authority of section 70(b), reject the contract upon which
the vendee's right is based. The vendee in Philadelphia Penn
Worsted had agreed to purchase real estate at a public auction. The
arrangement provided for a down payment with the balance of the
lease presupposes continuance, even in the face of a receivership . . so long
as the landlord's receivership estate is not burdened or put to loss, and by
"burdened" is not meant that the lease could be more profitable, but that it
entails a positive loss or encroachment on the corpus or capital of the estate.
See also Creedon & Zinman, supra note 26, at 1396-97.
29 4A COLLIER, supra note 6, 5 70A3(2), at 524. See also Watson v. Merrill, 136
F. 359 (8th Cir. 1905).
30 143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
3' Id.
32 Id.
3 In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960).
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purchase price to be paid in cash, and delivery of a deed and pos-
session at the time of settlement. This contract was held to be ex-
ecutory and subject to rejection by the seller's trustee.34
The First Circuit adopted a similar approach to section 70(b)
in Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo.3 5 Gulf had negotiated a pur-
chase and sale agreement with Puerto Rico Broilers, Inc., for land
to be used as a site for a filling station. Under this arrangement,
Gulf's installment payments were not to be credited to the purchase
price until the closing. The funds were to be held in escrow until
dosing and were to be returned to Gulf if the closing did not take
place for any reason other than the purchaser's default. Gulf had
made two of the required three payments when Broilers was ad-
judicated bankrupt. Because the closing had not occurred when
bankruptcy intervened, the court held that the contract was still
executory, and Broilers' trustee was empowered to reject it under
section 70(b). Although Gulf had no lien upon the bankrupt's
land prior to the time both parties fulfilled their contractual obliga-
tions, they were held to be entitled to a return of the money paid
because the trustee could not reject the escrow provisions of the
contract. But the court disallowed Gulf's efforts to: (1) exclude
the land from the sale of Broilers' assets; and (2) compel the trus-
tee to convey it to Gulf upon tender of the final payment36
Thus, the courts have found no basis within the Bankruptcy Act
and its underlying policies on which to deny the trustee the right to
reject a land sale contract, despite the fact that the vendee is willing
and able to perform.
III. CURRENT PROTECTION FOR THE LAND SALE VENDEE
Because the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy may reject the con-
tract under section 70 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, the land sale ven-
dee may lose his property and even the payments he has made. De-
spite the severity of this threat, there is little the vendee can do to
protect himself. The vendee has no remedy which is certain to be
effective. Indeed, there are only a few legal theories which might
offer him some protection.
First, the vendee could argue that he should be entitled to the
traditional breach of contract remedies of specific performance,
rescission and damages. Second, if he does not have a legal lien on
34 Id. at 665.
35 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963).
8. at 257, 260.
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his payments, the vendee could try to convince the bankruptcy court
to enforce an equitable lien by analogizing to non-bankruptcy cases.
Third, depending upon the state in which his land is located, the
vendee may also argue that the applicable state law converts his
land sale contract into a mortgage. Finally, the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act 7 may offer some assistance by requiring
the vendor to disclose certain information concerning his financial
position. However, the value of each of these remedies is question-
able, because they may be disallowed in bankruptcy court, and even
if allowed, because they may fail to afford complete protection.
This section will discuss these remedies and their inadequacies.
A. Contract Remedies
If the ordinary contract remedies of damages, rescission, and
specific performance were available to the vendee, he would be af-
forded substantial, or even complete protection. Section 70(b),
however, probably makes the latter two of these remedies inappli-
cable in bankruptcy court."' It is undeniable that the land sale con-
tract requires the vendor to transfer title to the vendee upon receipt
of the total purchase price, and that refusal to transfer is a breach
of the contract outside of bankruptcy. 39 Section 70(b), however,
gives the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy the right to reject the con-
tract, which would appear to preclude reliance on either of these
two traditional remedies. Moreover, if only the section 103 damage
action were allowed, and a damage judgment could be obtained, it
is unlikely that the assets of the bankrupt's estate could satisfy it in
full. And even if the damage judgment were paid in full, pay-
ment would probably not be equivalent to holding the property,4"
because of the uniqueness of the land and the buyer's lost invest-
ment opportunity.4'
37 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. 1971).
3 8 See notes 23-34 supra & accompanying text. 11 U.S.C. §§ 103 (a) (9), 103 (c)
(1970) specifically allow an action for damages.
3 9 See Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAmi
L. REV. 550, 567-74 (1965). Where a vendee has breached, the vendor has the fol-
lowing remedies: suit at law for damages; retention of payments as liquidated damages;
retention of deposit as an alternative performance; a vendor's lien; foreclosure by ju-
dicial sale; strict foreclosure of purchaser's contract rights; forfeiture of purchaser's pay-
ments; obtaining possession and quieting title. Id. at 550-67.
401d. at 570. See Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 178 (1851).
41 In County of Lincoln v. Fischer, 216 Ore. 421, 339 P.2d 1084 (1959), the pur-
chaser, upon proper payment, was entitled to specific performance where the vendor,
the county, had delayed for over a full year after the first installment was due before
attempting to declare a forfeiture, but the vendor continued to receive taxes paid by the
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Rescission, like damages, would probably be inadequate even if
it were available. The assets of the bankrupt's estate would not
provide full restitution and the vendee would be unable to retain
the property. Since most vendees would want to retain the prop-
erty, specific performance would seem the only complete contract
remedy. Yet the vendee cannot seek specific performance until he
has made the last payment and the vendor has failed to perform.
41
Consequently, when the vendor's bankruptcy intervenes before the
vendee can perform, the specific performance remedy is probably
made unavailable by section 70(b).
B. Liens in Bankruptcy
Some land sale contracts give the vendee a legal lien which
might provide for the return of the vendee's payments in the event
of the vendor's bankruptcy. A legal lien in the case of a lease was
given effect by a bankruptcy court in Cohen v. East Netherland
Holding Co.44
In Cohen, East Netherland, the lessee and builder of the prop-
erty in question, had negotiated an unrecorded lease which required
the lessor to pay for the value of the buildings constructed in the
event of the lessor's default. Under the lease and the applicable
state law, the lessee was entitled to remain in possession until that
value was paid.45 The lessor became bankrupt and his trustee re-
jected the unexpired portion of the lease and complied with the
saving clause of section 70(b): "Unless a lease of real property
expressly otherwise provides, a rejection of the lease or of any
covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor shall not deprive the
lessee of his estate."4 The lease provision was held to be a legal
purchaser. The market value of the property in question had soared from $500 to ap-
proximately $50,000.
4 2
.Lee, supra note 39, at 570. See Luette v. Bank of Italy, 42 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.
1930).
43 Few courts have yet spoken to the availability of specific performance. Where
the question was raised, courts held this remedy unavailable as a matter of law. See,
e.g., In re New York Investors Mutual Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
44258 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1958).
4 5 See Daniel Holding v. Two Thirty Four, W.F.S. St. Corp., 255 App. Div. 8, 5
N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (landlord required to compensate tenant for value of
building erected by tenant); Trustees of Columbia University v. Kalvin, 250 N.Y. 469,
166 N.E. 169 (1929) (at expiration of lease tenant may remain in possession until
landlord pays value of building or grants a new lease).
46 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). If this saving clause applied to vendees, as well as
lessees, the vendee would, of course, be fully protected. See notes 69-84 infra & accom-
panying text.
This provision of section 70(b) is an "equitable safeguard for an innocent party
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lien binding on the trustee in bankruptcy. Thus, by consensual
agreement, the lessee became empowered to retain possession of the
property, after the trustee had rejected, until the appraised value
was paid.47  In so doing the investment value which the lessee
would otherwise have lost was restored. Thus, the bankruptcy
court's recognition of legal liens should allow the lessee to regain
the payments he has made, asssuming that the bankrupt's estate has
sufficient assets to pay the lien. A legal lien will not, however,
enable the vendee to retain possession of his land, absent a saving
clause governing land sale contracts.
But in practice, many land sale vendees do not have legal liens.
Alternatively, a vendee without a legal lien can argue that he should
have an equitable lien for his payments. In non-bankruptcy situa-
tions, many state courts have recognized equitable liens when the
vendor has breached the contract. 48  For example, an Ohio court in
Cleveland Trust v. Bouse, which involved a purchaser who had in-
tervened in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding, held that, "[w]here
an executory contract for the sale of real property is breached by
the vendor, the purchaser is entitled to an equitable lien for the
amount he has paid on the purchase price.- 49  Later, expanding
upon Bouse, Wayne Building and Loan Co. v. Yarborough held
that the vendee's equitable lien in the land does not depend upon
his possession.5" Although the equitable lien theory has not yet
been raised in a bankruptcy court, it offers a direction for courts
willing to analogize between a vendor who has breached and a
vendor's trustee who has rejected. But even if a buyer were suc-
cessful in exercising an equitable lien, he would only receive his
who has based his affairs on the term provided in the lease." 4A COLLIER, supra note
6, 5 70.44, at 521.
47 In Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117, 137 A.2d 183 (1957), the Maryland Supreme
Court reached this point in a non-bankruptcy case involving a land vendee. It held
that the vendee was entitled not only to a decree for compensation, but also to a lien
upon the house and lot to secure payment from the vendor who had breached.
48The vendee's lien is similar to that of the vendor for unpaid purchase money.
See National Indem. Co. v. Banks, 376 F.2d 533, 534 (5th Cir. 1967).
49 163 Ohio St. 392, 397, 127 N.E.2d 7, 10 (1955). There is as much justice in
providing the vendee with a lien device for installments he has paid as in providing the
vendor a right to foreclose in order to get payments he has been promised by the con-
tract. King, Survey of Ohio Law-Equity, 7 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 282, 284 (1956).
The Bouse court, however, did not decide the priorities between a mortgage lien and
an equitable lien when the proceeds of sale were inadequate to satisfy both. Comment,
25 U. CQN. L. REv. 170 (1956).
50 111 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967).
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payments and would have no option to complete the contract and
obtain title to the land.5
If the equitable lien were used as a remedy in the bankruptcy
situation, there are certain technical problems which could limit its
value. 2 For example, the Bankruptcy Act states:
[tjhe recognition of equitable liens where available means of per-
fecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby declared to be
contrary to the policy of [section 60(a) (6)1 ... [plrovided, how-
ever, tihat, where the debtor's own interest is only equitable, he
can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate fully to
transfer an interest of that character . . .53
If the vendee does not have a legal lien where one could have been
obtained, this provision might result in his being denied an equitable
lien as well.
C. Conversion of the Land Sale Installment Contract
into a Mortgage
In some states the distinction between the land sale contract and
the mortgage has been eliminated, particularly when the vendee has
substantially performed his obligations under the contract. This
conversion of land sale contracts to mortgages has been effected
both judicially and legislatively in non-bankruptcy situations, and
although the state courts cannot override federal bankruptcy law,
the bankruptcy courts may accept a state's definition of what con-
stitutes a mortgage." If the conversion has occurred prior to bank-
ruptcy and is given effect by the bankruptcy court, then the trustee
is confronted with a contract which he cannot reject.
In Mid-State Investor's Corp. v. O'Steen, a Florida non-bank-
ruptcy case, the court interpreted a land sale contract as a mort-
gage 5  As part of a loan transaction to purchase a home, the
vendee in Mid-State had assigned his deed to the vendor and re-
ceived an unrecorded installment contract for the deed. The con-
tract provided for forfeiture and repossession upon default, and
when the vendee defaulted, the vendor repossessed the house. The
51 The right of a vendee who has a lien for purchase money paid. was held to take
priority over a tax lien against the seller in State Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Wehrly, 263 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio C.P. 1970).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (6) (1970).
5311 U.S.C. § 96(a) (6) (1970).
5 But cf. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1934).
55 133 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert. denied, 136 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
1962).
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vendee subsequently brought an action for trespass in which the
court held that the contract was a mortgage and that the vendor
had no right to repossess upon the vendee's default. The general
Florida rule underlying this decision is that "[aill conveyances ...
with the intention of securing the payment of money . . . shall be
deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to the same rules
of foreclosure ... as are prescribed in relation to mortgages."56 If
this rationale were permitted in bankruptcy court, the vendee would
become a mortgagor, immune from rejection of the contract by the
vendor's trustee.
Some courts, although not going to the extent of the Mid-State
decision, have been reluctant to strictly enforce the provisions of a
land sale contract when the purchaser has made a substantial num-
ber of payments. For example, in Rothenberg v. Follman,5" the
purchasers obtained relief in a forfeiture action, even though they
were in default on one installment and the contract provided that
time was of the essence. The Michigan court of appeals held that
forfeiture was unreasonable and the vendees were entitled to specific
performance where the amount in default was only $1500 principal
plus $225 interest, of a purchase price of $40,000, and some of the
purchasers had attempted to pay their share of the delinquent pay-
ment."' The inequity of allowing a vendor to reclaim land while
retaining the vendee's payments has also prompted the Iowa courts
to avoid unreasonable forfeitures.5" They have done so by inter-
preting the vendor's acceptance of part payment as a waiver of his
right to immediate forfeiture."° These cases, although not holding
56 FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 § 697-701 (1969). See also Thomas v. Thomas, 96 So.
2d 771 (Fla. 1957); Home Building & Loan Co. v. Rivers, 108 Fla. 23, 31, 145 So.
873, 876 (1933); 9 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 4714, at 254 (1958).
57 172 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
58 Id. at 849, 851. Similarly, in Land Development, Inc. v. Padgett, 369 P.2d 888
(Alaska 1962), the purchasers had been in possession of the realty in question for three
years prior to their default, and they had paid about two-thirds of the purchase price.
The court held that enforcement of forfeiture would be inequitable; "it would cause a
loss to the buyers all out of proportion to any injury that might be sustained by the
seller." Id. at 889. See also Dependabilt Homes v. White, 117 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio Cr.
App. 1951).
For the contrary view, that the vendor is entitled to rescission without tendering
back the payments made when the purchaser has failed to make the monthly payments
agreed upon, see Miami Investment Corp. v. Baker, 109 Ohio App. 334, 165 N.E.2d
690 (1959).
59 See Note, Iowa Land Installment Contracts: Acceptance of Part Payment as
Waiver, 55 IowA L. REV. 729, 731 (1970). See also Collins v. Isaacson, 158 N.W.2d
14, 17 (Iowa 1968).
oBut waiver of one default does not amount to a waiver for subsequent defaults.
See Cassiday v. Adamson, 208 Iowa 417, 421, 224 N.W. 508, 510 (1929).
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that the land sale contract is the same as a mortgage, have reached
the same result as did Mid-State and would provide the vendee the
same protection if followed in bankruptcy court.
In addition to the judicial efforts to protect the vendee, several
state legislatures have enacted statutory safeguards which, under
certain circumstances, effectively convert the installment contract in-
to a mortgage. A Maryland statute provides that a purchase-money
mortgage shall entirely supersede the land installment contract
when 40 percent of the original cash price has been paid.0' In
Ohio, the applicable provision reads:
If the vendee of a land installment contract has paid in accor-
dance with the terms of the contract for a period of five years or
more from the date of the first payment or has paid toward the pur-
chase price a total sum equal to or in excess of twenty percent
thereof, the vendor may recover possession of his property only by
use of a foreclosure proceeding and judicial sale of the foreclosed
property .... 62
As with the Maryland law, the Ohio statute appears to treat the in-
stallment contract like a mortgage if there has been substantial per-
formance as defined by the statute. California has created another
approach by providing for prepayments of the balance due on real
property sales contracts.' When the prepayments have been fully
made, title passes. This provision could protect the vendee who
prepays the balance of the contract, if he does so before the date of
bankruptcy.
Thus, once the vendee has reached the point at which his land
sale contract is converted into a mortgage,4 or the contract is pre-
paid, he would presumably be safe from rejection by the vendor's
trustee in bankruptcy. But just as with the non-bankruptcy case law,
it remains for these statutory provisions to be tested in bankruptcy
court.
61 When 40% or more of the original cash price of the property shall have
been paid, the vendee shall have the right (if no earlier period be fixed by
the contract) to demand a conveyance of the premises mentioned in the con-
tract, on the condition that he execute a purchase money mortgage to the
vendor, or to a mortgagee procured by the vendee. MD. CODE ANN. art. 21,
§ 112(7) (1966).
6 2 OHIO REV. CODE § 5313.07 (Page Supp. 1969).
6 3 "A buyer shall be entitled to prepay all or any part of the balance due on any
real property sales contract with respect to the sale of land which has been subdivided
into a residential lot or lots which contain a dwelling for not more than four hundred
families." CAL CIrv. CODE § 2985.6 (West 1968).
64 This may also happen when the installment contract is used as an interim device.
The vendor retains title until the vendee has paid enough, under contract terms, to
transform the transaction into an executed sale, in which the remaining indebtedness is
secured by a trust deed. Warren, supra note 13, at 609.
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D. The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
The reporting requirement of the Interstate Land Sales Full Dis-
closure Act may operate as a protective device and give the vendee
enough knowledge about his investment to enable him to avoid the
problems that might arise if his vendor takes bankruptcy. The Act
provides that the vendor must furnish the vendee with a property
report, stating, inter alia, the consequences to the vendee in the
event that: (1) the vendor becomes bankrupt; (2) the vendor's
blanket mortgage is foreclosed; or (3) the vendor defaults on any
lien obligation."' In addition, the vendor must state whether the
vendee's down payment and installment payments will be placed in
escrow."6 If the vendor fails to furnish a property report to the
vendee within 48 hours before the signing of the contract, the ven-
dee may cancel and obtain a refund of payments. If the vendor
does provide a report, but it is one that contains "an untrue state-
ment of a material fact" or omits "to state a material fact," the
vendee may bring an action for damages."7 Of course, if the vendor
is bankrupt, an action for damages is not guaranteed to permit the
vendee a return of his payments.
Although laudable as a remedy for fraudulent practices in inter-
state land sales, the foregoing provisions, in their current form, will
not help the vendee when the vendor has entered bankruptcy. It
is not a regulatory statute. As the Act's sponsor, Senator Williams,
pointed out: "The only purpose of this legislation is to give the
purchaser the necessary information upon which he can make his
own investment decision.""8
In Summary, it is evident that there are no tested legal theories
6524 C.F.R. § 1710.110, 5J 4, 5 (1971).
66 Id. at § 1710.110, 5 8 (1971).
6 7 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV §
1418, 82 Stat. 590.
68S. REP. NO. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Department of Housing
and Urban Development admits:
The law is designed to afford the prospective buyer a full and fair dis-
closure of the facts about a subdivision offering. But, if the buyer ignores or
fails to read and understand the property report, the consumer protection as-
pects of the law are virtually negated. The law will light the threshold but
not unlock the door. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
CONSUMER PROTECTION: INTERSTATE LAND SALES, HUD-15-F (2) (Aug.
1970).
For a copy of this pamphlet, send to: Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration, U.S.
Dept. of Housing & Urban Development, Washington, D.C. 20411.
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which the vendee can use to protect himself fully against the rejec-
tion of the contract by the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy. Several
arguments are available, such as the lien or conversion theory, but
it is uncertain whether the bankruptcy court would accept them.
Consequently, in order to ensure that the vendee be legally pro-
tected, further legislative and judicial remedies should be contem-
plated.
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES
Of the proposals to be considered, the most effective remedy
would be congressional amendment of section 70(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. This would offer complete protection to the vendee
and provide uniformity among the states. Alternatives to amend-
ment of the Act are increased state regulation, more extensive use
of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, requiring place-
ment of payments and title in escrow, and bonding of the vendor.
But none of these alternatives would provide the total solution
which amendment offers.
A. Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act
To protect the vendee in a land sale contract when the vendor's
trustee in bankruptcy rejects, section 70(b) should be amended to
include the following proviso: "provided, however, that the trustee
of a vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land shall not
reject such contract where the vendee is continuing to meet the obli-
gations of the contract."69  The purpose of the proposed amend-
ment is to prevent the trustee from rejecting an executory land con-
tract unless the vendee has breached. The vendee would thus be
permitted to retain possession of the land and complete his per-
formance; the vendee would lose his right to possession and to con-
tinue performance only if he were in breach of the contract. More-
over, these rights would become available to the vendee once he
had begun complying with the contract terms and there would be
no need for the bankruptcy court to determine whether the vendee
had substantially performed at the time of the vendor's bankruptcy.
09 The amendment would not create administrative problems for the trustee. Even
if the contract had several years remaining, the trustee would be able to sell this asset -
the right to receive payments from the vendee - at a discount and distribute the result-
ing proceeds to creditors.
Assumption of an executory contract, unlike rejection, must be passed upon by the
court because it involves the continuation of liabilities which constitute an expense to
the bankrupes estate. 4A COLLMR, supra note 6, 5 70A3(5), at 529.
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The vendee's right to possession, contingent upon his tendering pay-
ment in accordance with the contract, provides him with protections
similar to those of a mortgagor.70
The proposed amendment would have to overcome a number of
objections. Initially, creditors would argue that the trustee should
be able to reject an executory contract in order to allow the trustee
to negotiate a better price for the land and eventually to give greater
satisfaction to the estate's creditors.7' Supporters of the amendment
would contend that a different rationale applies where the vendor,
normally a creditor, is the bankrupt. First, the contract is no longer
executory as to the vendor - except for his conveying the title
when the vendee completes performance - and therefore should be
free from the trustee's power of rejection. Second, an already prof-
itable contract is not a burden on the estate. Third, equity favors
the vendee who is willing to meet his contract obligations. Allow-
ing a greater profit than originally contemplated simply to benefit
the creditors, at the expense of a non-breaching vendee, is unjust.7 2
But the most compelling justification for the amendment lies in
its economic consequences. The amendment would no longer allow
the vendee to be used as a resource by the trustee to increase the
bankrupt's estate, and the cost of the bankruptcy would be com-
pletely borne by commercial creditors. This would increase the credi-
tors' incentive to deal only with sound vendors and would entirely
remove this "policing" function from the vendees, who occupy the
poorest position to exercise such control.73 Moreover, the commer-
cial creditors are capable of distributing the risks of a vendor's bank-
ruptcy, but the vendees are not.74  The creditors can simply pass on
70 Whether the vendee should have an equity of redemption like the mortgagor's is
a separate question. It is not unreasonable to include it, although one can argue that
the vendee should be bound to the terms of the contract regarding timely payment.
71 See 4A COLLIER, supra note 6, 5 70.43(2), at 521-25. The thrust of the entire
Bankruptcy Act is to enable the trustee to marshal assets of the bankrupt debtor for the
benefit of the creditors. To accomplish this purpose the trustee is free to assume only
those liabilities which involve profit to the estate and which the estate can afford to
administer.
72 It can be argued that the vendee, particularly where he is a consumer, is entitled
to a more lenient application of a bankruptcy statute written for the needs of commercial
creditors.
73 Normally the vendee would not deal with land vendors as extensively as might a
creditor. Consequently, the vendee is at a disadvantage in keeping track of the vendor's
financial integrity. When the vendee is a consumer, it is unrealistic to assume he would
have any significant impact as a financial "policeman."
74 Only if a vendee were widely engaged in purchasing land could he begin to dis-
tribute the risks of a vendor's bankruptcy in a smooth fashion. But a vendee dealing
on this scale might not even use land sale installment contracts. With the small scale
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the increased costs of vendor bankruptcy by raising the cost of
credit.7 5 Most likely, the vendees would ultimately pay for most
of this increase in the cost of credit. But they would be paying as
a group, and therefore the risks of bankruptcy would be distributed
evenly and rationally - rather than falling completely on a small
and arbitrary group of vendees.
Against these attractive economics, one could only argue that
the proposal interferes with the normal role of the bankruptcy trus-
tee.7' The trustee may have several alternative ways of performing
his function of maximizing the assets of the bankrupt's estate.
These alternatives may or may not require available cash. But if
cash is required, then the trustee's inability to reject an executory
land sale contract and sell the land for cash at a higher price may
hinder the trustee's disposition of the estate's other assets. Espe-
cially in a reorganization proceeding, it may be best to reject execu-
tory land sale contracts. The ultimate consideration in a reorgani-
zation is to preserve the business, and the funds available to accom-
plish this might be available only by rejecting the land sale contracts
and selling the land for its market value.77
To counter the argument that the amendment would impede the
trustee's proper function, the supporters of the proposal must rely
primarily on the beneficial economic consequences that would result
from its enactment. In addition, regardless of the economic effects
of the amendment, it is still a questionable practice to penalize the
vendee in order to provide an occasional added impetus for a suc-
cessful reorganization. The vendee in our situation is not in breach
purchaser, and particularly with the consumer, the present law allows no feasible way
to distribute these risks.
There is another way that risks might be reallocated. As in the securities industry,
self-insurance by the vendors could become prevalent if the vendors' need for financial
stability increased sufficiently.
75 This possibility may be unduly pessimistic. If the creditors were prompted by
the amendment to refuse to deal with the more unstable vendors, the number of bank-
ruptcies might decrease, allowing the creditors to make the same rate of return without
increasing the cost of credit. This same result could be achieved by stricter legal con-
trol over the vendor's finances.
76 The trustee's function is to assume or reject an executory contract. If he takes
no action, the contract is deemed to be rejected under section 70(b) of the Act. Situa-
dons occur in which the trustee might take other actions. For example, if the vendee
is in default, the vendor's trustee would enforce or abandon the bankrupt's claim. 4A
COLLIER, supra note 6, 5 70.43 (2), at 522.
7 7 The later amendments to the Bankruptcy Act were based on the theory that busi-
ness should be preserved where possible. H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 8680 (1938).
In order to "preserve" the business, it is quite possible that the trustee would choose to
assume executory land sale contracts. In this manner, the business might be received
better by future vendees and stand a greater chance of a successful reorganization.
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of the contract and it is unfair to him to use his funds as the basis
for reviving the vendor.7 8
Even if passed, there is a potential barrier that could limit the
amendment's effectiveness. The purpose of the amendment could
be undercut if the parties agreed to a contract clause which required
termination of the agreement upon the vendor's bankruptcy. Sec-
tion 70(b) permits enforcement of termination clauses for leases,
and the bankruptcy courts have given effect to such claims.79 A
similar position with regard to land sale contracts could render the
amendment meaningless if this type of clause proliferated.80 But
courts could reasonably refuse to enforce a termination clause in the
land sale contract. First, the termination clause could be held in-
effective as contrary to the policy of the proposed amendment."'
Second, the vendee wants to continue the contract, unlike the lessee
who wants to be free from the obligations of a burdensome lease. -
Moreover, although the Bankruptcy Act permits lease termination
clauses, it also provides that the lessor's trustee cannot deprive the
lessee of his estate.83 In Cohen, "estate" meant possession until the
lessee received payment on his lien. By analogy, the vendee who
has relied upon possesssion under the contract should also have an
"estate" - i.e., the right to continue possession as long as he per-
forms his obligations.84
7 8 The imbalance of the equities is particularly severe where only a few additional
reorganizations would be successful because the vendee's contract was rejected and the
land resold. But even if one does find these arguments against the proposed amend-
ment convincing, there are possible compromise positions that would be somewhat less
inequitable. For example, the vendee could be allowed to obtain title to the land by
paying the current appraisal value, minus the full amount of the payments already
made (adjusted for the cost of credit). This approach would not satisfy the arguments
either for or against the amendment, but simply represents a possible "political" com-
promise.
79 J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCy 173-74 (1956).
80 It is conceivable that the creditors would require such clauses as a condition to
extending credit.
81 In the case of a lease, the Act allows termination clauses because both parties may
wish to be freed upon bankruptcy. But there is no reason why the vendor's bankruptcy
should affect a vendee's desire to own the land in question.
82 J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 79, at 174.
83 See notes 44-46 supra & accompanying text.
84 The rationale for the lease provision in section 70(b) was given by the court in
In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D. Ga. 1943) :
In case of sale by the trustee, a purchaser assured of a reasonable rent for a
fixed term will be satisfied, and, meanwhile, a tenant (who is an innocent
party) who may have made his business plans on the assumption he would
occupy the premises for the term is not treated inequitably.
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B. Increased Regulation by the States
In the absence of an amendment to section 70(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the states can play a more active role in correcting the
inequity to land sale vendees when the vendor files for bankruptcy.
Although state law cannot supersede the federal Bankruptcy Act, a
state can affect the outcome in bankruptcy court by controlling the
law regarding the vesting of title to property."5 A state can achieve
a salutary result by converting the land sale contract into a mortgage
by new legislation. Ohio law, for example, appears to convert the
land contract into a mortgage when the vendee has paid in accor-
dance with the terms of contract for five years or has paid more than
20 percent of the purchase price.86 If the bankruptcy court fol-
lowed the conversion statute, the trustee would be powerless to re-
ject absent a breach by the vendee.
In addition to conversion statutes, states could provide protection
to a vendee by legislating controls to create a more financially sol-
vent vendor who would be less likely to take bankruptcy. For ex-
ample, Ohio prohibits the vendor's own mortgage from exceeding
the balance due on the vendee's contract without the latter's con-
sent. 7  This statute should discourage potential developers from
entering the business unless they can secure reasonable mortgages
and adequate financial backing.88
In addition to providing this kind of indirect financial regula-
tion, a state could legislate more directly and prohibit a company
85
"But cf. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
86 Oio REv. CODE § 5313.07 (Page Supp. 1969). The statute also provides the
vendee in default with a thirty day grace period before the vendor can bring forfeiture
proceedings. OHno REv. CODE §§ 5313.05-.06 (Page Supp. 1969). Although this
statutory grace period appears to give the vendee a thirty day equity of redemption, the
vendor's trustee in bankruptcy can still reject the contract.
8 7 Omfo REV. CODE § 5313.02 (Page Supp. 1969) provides:
(A) ... The contract shall contain at least the following provisions ...
(13) A provision that, if the vendor defaults on any mortgages on the prop-
erty, the vendee can pay on said mortgage and receive credit on the land in-
stallment contract;
(B) No vendor shall hold a mortgage on property sold by a land install-
ment contract in an amount greater than the balance due under such contract,
except a mortgage which covers real property in addition to the property which
is the subject of the contract where the vendor has made written disclosure to
the vendee of the amount of such mortgage and the release price, if any, at-
tributable to the property in question.
No vendor shall place a mortgage on the property in an amount greater
than the balance due on the contract without the consent of the vendee.
88 Cf. Hearings on S. 2672 (Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act) Before the
Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
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from selling land by installment contracts if it is under-financed or
uses questionable business practices. For example, Ohio has de-
clared that a vendor's dealing in "grossly unfair terms" violates the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act's antifraud provisions. 89
And if the vendor fails to furnish the division of securities "such
other information as the division requires,"' (i.e., as to the vendor's
financial condition), the state might be able to deny the vendor a
license, as well as bring the other enforcement mechanisms to bear.
Also, under Ohio law, if a practice works "material prejudice" to
the vendee, a court of common pleas may appoint a receiver with
the power to "sell, convey and assign such property, and to hold
and dispose of proceeds." 91
Florida has authorized its Land Sales Board to issue cease and
desist orders92 for violations of the Florida Uniform Land Sales
Practices Law. 3  Purchasers are accorded civil remedies when the
subdivider disposes of land in violation of the Act, and vendors
face criminal penalties for willful violations.94  New York's pro-
tective approach creates a trust that segregates the vendee's pay-
ments from the vendor's other assets. The funds in the trust are
applied toward clearance of title to the land to be conveyed to the
purchaser.95 The vendee is protected if bankruptcy occurs because
the vendor's trustee cannot reach the payments placed in trust and
must allow the vendee to perform." This approach would expand
upon the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, which seeks to
limit fraudulent land sales but does nothing to correct the problem
caused by good faith, but under-financed developers.
C. Requiring Escrow Agreements Under State Law and
the Disclosure Act
State laws could also be modified to require the interstate vendor
to make escrow arrangements a condition of doing business (i.e., ob-
89 OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.33(D) (Page 1953).
9 0 0H1io REV. CODE § 1707.33(B) (10) (Page 1953).
91 OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.27 (Page 1953).
9 2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 478.171(1) (1965).
93 FLA. LAWS ch. 67-229, §§ 1-35 (1967). The statute was formerly titled the Flor-
ida Installment Land Sales Law, which had authorized the earlier Florida Installment
Land Sales Board. See generally Boyer, Real Property Law 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 278,
280 (1967).
9 4 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 478.191, 478.211 (1965).
9 5 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW, art. 9-A, § 338 (4) (McKinney 1968).
96 Id.
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taiming a license) in the state where the vendee resides. Escrowing
the payments would at least protect the installments of the vendee
that had already been paid.
Already, the Interstate Act implicitly appreciates the protection
which escrowing offers the vendee, for escrowing is part of the
method in which the vendor may obtain an exemption from the
Act. 7  The exemption is available and the time of sale is con-
sidered the effective date of the conveyance if: (1) the contract of
sale requires delivery of a deed to the purchaser within 120 days
following the signing of the sale contract; and (2) any earnest
money deposit or other payment on account of the purchase price,
made by the purchaser prior to the effective date of the conveyance,
is placed in an escrow account 98 Although this provision is option-
al, similar conditions requiring the vendor to convey title and place
the vendee's payments in escrow would offer the vendee valuable
safety in his transaction with the vendor. The purchaser would
note such arrangement in the property report, and title would re-
main with the vendee. Payments would be made to a bank in the
vendee's state.9
While it has been held that the vendor's trustee cannot reject
an executory land contract and simultaneously retain funds deposited
in escrow, 1' ° whether placement of title in escrow gives the vendee
the right to continue performance is an undecided issue. 0 1 Regard-
less of the bankruptcy court's interpretation of that issue, escrowing
of funds would force the vendor to obtain other funds to finance his
mortgage and would prevent the under-capitalized developer from
entering the market place. More importantly, the vendee who per-
forms would have protection for his payments, and possibly for title
as well.
D. Bonding Requirements for Land Sale Vendors
Bonding is the least desirable solution, but one which would
provide the vendee with some protection. 0 2 Vendors could be re-
0724 C.F.R. § 1710.10(a)-(m), as amended 35 Fed. Reg. 6065-66 (1970).
981d. at § 1710.10(j) (2) (ii).
09This escrow device, known as an "impound account," can be utilized in Ohio.
OHiO REV. CODE § 1707.33 (E) (Page 1953).
100 E.g., Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1963).
101 Escrow and trust law would seem to dictate that when a title is placed in escrow
it is no longer a part of the vendor's estate, and consequently if the vendor takes bank-
ruptcy the vendee should still be entitled to continue performance.
'
0 2 Performance bonds have been required for chartered air carriers since January
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quired to obtain surety bonds to guarantee performance of the con-
tract. But unfortunately, "performance" would mean only a return
of the total payments made by the vendee when bankruptcy inter-
vened.
Like an escrow arrangement, bonding insurance creates a fund
outside the assets of the vendor's estate, so that the vendee can still
recover his payments if bankruptcy occurs, even though the estate
may be penniless. The vendor's general creditors might argue that
they should be entitled to a share of such a fund since it arises out
of an executory contract with the vendor, but in many situations it
will be the vendee who has paid for the bonding. Although the
cost of bonding would likely be passed on to the vendee, when bal-
anced against the alternative risks it becomes a price worth paying.
V. CONCLUSION
Today the basic problem is that the land sale contract, absent
a trust arrangement or a remedial statute, is executory. Unlike a
mortgage, it may be rejected by the vendor's trustee in bankruptcy.
This is inequitable because the contract is no longer executory as to
the bankrupt vendor. Moreover, the vendee, whether commercial
or consumer, is least able to "police" the vendors and is in no posi-
tion to distribute the costs of the vendor's bankruptcy. The vendee
who continues his payments should have the right to obtain full
title to the property.
The current heavy-saturation advertising campaigns of many
land developers - aimed at unsophisticated people seeking lots for
recreation or retirement - have created a need for relief beyond
mere rescission for fraud. The need exists for legally binding de-
vices to enable the vendee to complete performance and obtain title.
Other creditors of the vendor may raise the objection that once
the Bankruptcy Act has been amended as proposed, such legislation
may be carried too far and lead to a general diminution of the trus-
tee's function. But the proposed legislation seems reasonable, and,
overall, it should be a beneficial force both in keeping under-fi-
nanced vendors out of the market and in distributing the effects of
bankruptcy in a rational manner. The intent is not to close down
commercial vendors or the land development business. Far from
1971, after bankrupt carriers stranded passengers in Europe. The tour operator is now
required to furnish a surety bond for twice the amount of the charter price of the air
transportation supplied in connection with the tour. This requirement is specified in
the Civil Aeronautics Board regulations governing charter trips. 14 C.F.R. § 378.16(a)
(1971). See id. at § 378.16(b) for alternatives to bonding.
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it - if the vendee can go forward on his land sale contract knowing
that he will be protected even from the vendor's bankruptcy, both
the commercial vendor and the consumer land sale business would
benefit.
HowARD A. LEvY
